

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY ON CHALLENGES IN HUMAN MIND AND BODY RELATIONSHIP

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Abstract

The mind-body relationship has been a much talked about issue in the Philosophy of Mind. Each one of the individuals who embrace any examination in consciousness, essentially need to contact upon this subject. One of the disrupted riddles is about whether consciousness is a piece of material or mental realm. It has tested the scientists and in addition philosophers to search for a few solutions. They have proposed a few speculations to address the issue. Among a few speculations dualism and physicalism were the most talked about. There are some pivotal inquiries with respect to mind-body relationship, for example, how would they associate, regardless of whether the mind and body contrast in degree and nature as well as in kind? The landing of neuroscience with its few logical examinations has fundamentally tested the comprehension of relationship among mind and body and constrained us to reconsider our situations about it. Along these lines, there is a restored energy in learning about consciousness in current occasions and it has tossed open a few different methods for settling this issue. This paper will quickly examine on how unique philosophers saw the relationship among mind and body in a man and fundamentally investigate different speculations of dualism and physicalism in detail and present their challenges.

Keywords: *mind, body, relationship, philosophy, theories, etc.*

1. INTRODUCTION

For a long time, we have been attempting to comprehend the mind-body relationship in a person. The trouble behind clarifying the relationship between mind-body in a person is that s/he is a dynamic entity. In this manner, one is in a proceeded with mode of knowing oneself. There are a few thinkers who hold the view that a person is made out of body and mind. In the meantime there are likewise a few thinkers who restrict this thought. Presently we will talk about the perspectives of a few philosophers. There are a few old philosophers like Plato and Aristotle who communicated their perspectives on mind-

body relationship in a person. For Plato, human being is made out of body and soul. Body is only a prison house into which his/her soul has been locked. His

comprehension of person is unique in relation to our comprehension of human being. For Plato, person has a place with understandable world and human being has a place with sensible world. Also person can be changed while human being can't be on the grounds that human being has a place with physical dimension of being. In this manner he says "that a person, the subject of intrigue, is certainly

not a human being yet rather a soul, an entity unmistakable from that of human being." Here we can see an obvious qualification of soul and body in Plato's thinking. Aristotle, unexpectedly, saw the mind-body relationship from a totally unique edge.

He says that a person is "a composite not of body and soul but rather of prime matter and the human soul which as a generous shape." He doesn't see the refinement among mind and body; rather he makes the qualification among matter and frame. Consequently, Aristotle comprehends body and soul as not of two finish beings in struggle with one another however complimenting each other in light of the fact that matter and frame are indistinguishable in an essential substance.

There are additionally modern philosophers like Hegel, Immanuel Kant and John Locke who comprehend the mind-body relationship in an unexpected way. For Hegel, an individual is a piece of the bigger existence of the Mind. He says that, "Mind or soul, goes through argumentative phases of advancement, uncovering itself as subjective mind, target mind and supreme mind. The subjective mind conveys what needs be as soul, consciousness and spirit." From the above explanations it is certain that he offers significance to mind alone. He has consumed absolutely the body into mind; for he says, "It (mind) exemplifies itself, makes a body for itself, and turns into a specific, singular soul." Therefore what really exists for him is mind and not body. Anyway Immanuel Kant talks about otherworldly dualism instead of substance

dualism of the person. He considers person to be a Transcendental Self in light of the fact that there is a dimension of self-mindfulness that is far beyond the classes of ordinary philosophies. Human being is distant from everyone else a balanced being who has a will and a free decision of activity. So Kant proposes person as a transcendental free being, a thought that the internal identity isn't bound by the laws of nature. In any case, John Locke, being a modern logician comprehends human person as that of antiquated philosophers. For him mind is the genuine person and body is just a possession. He isolates mind from body and demonstrates that body is just a material reality. He says that, "Each man has a property in his very own person. This no Body has any Right to yet himself." For him mind is the genuine person and in the genuine person the body perspective is coordinated absolutely into it.

2. MIND BODY RELATIONSHIP

The primary completely verbalized record of the relationship between soul (psyche) and body (soma) in western writing can be followed to craft by Plato, whose works are extraordinary on various records. In any case, be that as it may, even in the pre-Socratic thinking, there was a propensity to isolate the soul from body. It is noted by numerous that, by the 6th century BC, with the coming of Orphism into specific sectors of Greek thinking, the psyche or soul began to be viewed as having a superior case than the title of one's genuine self. In addition to the fact that it was held to survive the body, it was considered to be that whereby we are both physically alive and furthermore alive as normal consequently dependable specialists. The

ontological status of soul was identified with the nature of the life lived. It was the potential subject of everlasting reward or discipline for the nature of the life. Status of substantial presence is consigned to a type of worldly way station. For Socrates, soul had a more grounded case than body. Soul was self obviously more imperative than body. Consequently soul has an a lot more prominent consideration than the body. Surely, "the consideration of the soul" has been characterized as the specific heart of Socratic philosophy."1 As for its temperament, Socrates appears to concur with Pythagoreans, Heraclites and others that soul is the ground for our sound and good and in addition our biological self. The body and its wants are altogether in charge of war, fiction and fighting. Since it is the obtaining of cash which is in charge of all wars it is the body which constrains us to secure cash. We are slaves in its administration. For every one of these reasons the body gives us no time for philosophy. To top it all off, on the off chance that it gives us whenever off, and we do inspire an opportunity to enquire into anything; the body keeps springing up at each point in our enquiry. It causes tumult and confusion thus avoiding us seeing reality. Socrates says, "it has been well and genuinely demonstrated to us that on the off chance that we are regularly going to increase pure knowledge of anything, we should dispose of the body. Also, we should take a gander at things themselves with the soul itself.

The topic of the relation between the mental and the physical can be acted identically like about mental and physical properties, ideas, or predicates. A property is a component of a protest, for example, being round, or being three feet from the

world's surface. An idea, as we have stated, is a typical element in various idea substance communicated by a general term. We send ideas in thinking about a thing's properties. Along these lines, relating to the property of being round is the idea of being round, or of roundness. When I believe that this ball is round, thus consider it having the property of being round, I have a felt that includes the idea of being round. I am said to bring the ball under the idea of roundness. Predicates express ideas, and are utilized to ascribe properties to objects. Along these lines, 'is round' communicates (in English) the idea of roundness, and is utilized to characteristic the property of being round. We may state it chooses that property. For each property there is an interesting idea that is about it, and the other way around. Beyond what one predicate can express a similar idea, and choose a similar property, yet then they should be synonymous. Relating to every property class (mental or physical, e.g.) is a classification of ideas and predicates. Therefore, any inquiry we get some information about the relation of mental and physical properties can be recast as about ideas or predicates, and the other way around. The fundamental choices in thinking about the relation of mental and physical properties can be clarified as far as the accompanying three sentence frames, where 'is M' speaks to a mental predicate, and 'is P' speaks to a physical predicate

[A] For all x, if x is P, and then x is M

[B] For all x, if x is M, then x is P

[C] For all x, x is M if and only if x is P

In spite of the fact that [C] is proportional to the conjunction of [A] and [B], it will be valuable to state it independently. The relation of the mental to the physical is dictated by which cases of [A]– [C] are valid or false, and on what grounds. One could hold each to be essentially valid or fundamentally false, in one of three faculties of "need": conceptual, metaphysical (purported), and nomological. Two ideas that figure unmistakably in exchanges of the mind–body problem can be described in this framework. The first is that of reduction, and the second that of supervenience. Each can be conceptual, metaphysical, or nomological. Conceptual necessities are certainties grounded in the concepts used to express them. This is the most grounded sort of need. What is conceptually important is so in each metaphysically and nomologically conceivable world, however not the other way around. Knowledge of conceptual realities can be gotten from reflection on the concepts included, and require not lay on experience (customarily, knowledge of one's own cognizant mental states is considered experiential knowledge). They are therefore said to be comprehensible from the earlier. Knowledge acquired along these lines is from the earlier knowledge. A proposition known based on experience is known a posteriori, or empirically. Knowledge so based is a posteriori or experimental knowledge. Conceptual realities are not refutable by the substance of any experiences. A sentence communicating (in a language L) a conceptual truth is analytically valid (in L), or, equally, explanatory (in L) (henceforth we preclude the relativization). A sentence is diagnostic iff its fact is

involved by obvious importance proclamations about its constituents. For instance, 'None of the inhabitants of Dublin lives somewhere else', or 'There is no most noteworthy prime number' would ordinarily be viewed as scientific. Conceptual reduction of mental to physical properties, or the other way around, is the most grounded association that can get between them. (We say identically, for this situation, that mental concepts/predicates can be broke down regarding physical concepts/predicates, or the other way around.) If a mental property is conceptually reducible to a physical property, at that point two conditions are met: (a) the occurrence of [C], in which 'is M' is supplanted by a predicate that selects the mental property, and 'is P' by a (potentially unpredictable) predicate that chooses the physical property, is conceptually essential, and (b) the concepts communicated by 'is P' are conceptually prior to those communicated by 'is M', or, in other words that we must have the concepts communicated by 'is P' with the end goal to comprehend those communicated by 'is M', however not the other way around (think about the order in which we develop geometrical concepts for instance). The second clause offers substance to the possibility that we have affected a reduction, for it requires the physical concepts to be more fundamental than the mental concepts. A conceptual reduction of a mental property to a physical property demonstrates the mental property to be types of physical property. This adds up to the distinguishing proof of a mental property with a physical property. Essentially for the reduction of a physical property to a mental property

One could hold that examples of were conceptually important without holding that either the mental or the physical was conceptually reducible to the next. For this situation, their important correlation would be disclosed by bid to another arrangement of concepts neither physical nor mental, as far as which each could be comprehended. For instance, it is conceptually vital that each triangle is a trilateral, yet neither of these thoughts gives a conceptual reduction of the other. 'Supereminence' is a term of craftsmanship utilized in much current philosophical literature on the mind– body problem. It might be questioned that it is required with the end goal to talk about the mind– body problem, however given its current broad utilize, no contemporary study of the mind– body problem ought to exclude its notice. An assortment of related ideas has been communicated utilizing it. In spite of the fact that changing in quality among themselves, they are commonly planned to express propositions weaker than reductionism, summoning just adequacy conditions, as opposed to conditions that are both important and adequate. Supervenience claims shouldn't give explanations, but instead to put constraints on the form of a clarification of one sort of properties as far as another. I present here a meaning of one group of properties supervening on another, which will be helpful for formulating a position we will call 'physicalism', and which will be valuable later in our dialog of a situation on the relation of mental to physical properties known as 'functionalism'. We start with 'conceptual supervenience'.

F-properties conceptually supervene on G-properties iff for any x, if x has a property f from F, and then there is a property g

from G, such that x has g and it is conceptually necessary that if x has g, then x has f.

Conceptual reduction of one family of properties to another suggests shared conceptual supervenience. Be that as it may, the supervenience of one family of properties on another does not suggest their reducibility to them. I will portray 'physicalism' as the situation according to which, whatever mental properties objects have, they conceptually supervene on the physical properties objects have, and whatever psychological laws there are, the physical laws involve them. This permits somebody who imagines that nothing has mental properties, and that there are no mental laws, to consider a physicalist, whatever his view about the conceptual relations among mental and physical properties. The definition here is stipulative, however it is expected to follow a boundless (however not all inclusive) utilization in the philosophical literature on the mind– body problem. The inquiry whether physicalism is valid, so comprehended, marks a fundamental divide in positions on the mind– body problem.

Nomological need we can clarify as far as conceptual need and the idea of a characteristic law. An explanation that p is nomologically essential iff it is conceptually fundamental that if L, the case p, where "L" remains in for a sentence communicating every one of the laws of nature, regardless of whether physical or not (including "boundary conditions" to "L" yields more prohibitive thoughts). I offer just a negative portrayal of metaphysical need, which has gotten impressive consideration in contemporary

exchange of the mind– body problem. We will contend that no idea corresponds to the articulation "metaphysical need" in these specific situations, in spite of it's across the board utilize. For now, we can state that metaphysical need should be of a sort that can't be found from the earlier, yet which is more grounded than nomological need, and weaker than conceptual need. To acquire corresponding ideas of metaphysical and nomological supervenience, we substitute 'metaphysically' or 'nomologically' for 'conceptually' in our portrayal above.

Metaphysical and nomological reduction necessitate that bi-conditionals of the form [C] are metaphysically or nomologically fundamental (yet nothing more grounded), individually. In any case, reduction is uneven. So we should likewise give a sense to the possibility that one side of the biconditional communicates properties that are more essential. By and by, the inquiry is the means by which to comprehend the asymmetry for metaphysical or nomological reduction of the mental to the physical. There is nothing on account of metaphysical or nomological need that corresponds to conceptual priority. It looks as though all the better we can do is to ground the coveted asymmetry in physical properties being essential in our general explanatory plan. This is generally comprehended to imply that the physical establishes an explanatorily shut framework, while the mental does not. This implies each occasion can be clarified by summoning physical antecedents, however not by conjuring mental antecedents.

3. THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

Questions in the philosophy of mind for the most part fall into two categories. The first is a category of epistemological questions that get some information about what we can know with regards to the mind. These incorporate questions about how we can think about the mental states of others, how we can think about our very own mental states, and the idea of these forms of knowledge. The other category comprises in metaphysical questions that get some information about the fundamental structure of the mind. The problem that has dominated the philosophy of mind in the course of the most recent three centuries or along these lines, and which will give the premise of these notes, is a metaphysical one: the mind-body problem. On its substance, the mind-body problem is by all accounts a genuinely straightforward one. It adds up to the test to state what the relation is between our minds, or mental states, and our bodies, or brains. For what reason would it be advisable for us to be moved to think about this problem by any means? The genuine force of the problem originates from two arrangements of intuitions, the two of which appear to be quite convincing. The first of these is the instinct that the mind and the body are two altogether different sorts of things. The body is an all-encompassing object in the physical world – it has a size, a weight, a shape, a spatio-temporal area, I can feel it, taste it, smell and see it. Furthermore, as a physical object in the world, it is similarly too set as other worldly physical objects to causally collaborate with the things around it. My body gets onto trains, sits on chairs, gets coffee cups, and shakes hands with other bodies. Moreover, the majority of this is done in a way that would appear to

be superbly good to a physicist. Much the same as other objects in the world, our bodies conform to the common and physical laws – the laws of gravity, causation, motion, etc. In short, our bodies simply appear to be physical things like some other. What's more, the equivalent, I take it, can be said of our brains. The mind, conversely, does not appear to resemble this by any stretch of the imagination. Our mental states don't appear to be the sorts of things we could situate in the physical world or experience through the faculties – to talk along these lines just appears to get the sort of thing we're managing incorrectly. On the off chance that we begin asking whether our mental states are liable to laws of gravity, or could get onto trains, or weighs more than a sack of sugar then it just appears as though we've committed an error. As pointed out over, it is difficult to state exactly what properties we can really attribute to our mental states, yet it will presumably be something like consciousness, deliberateness, subjectivity, or the way that there's something it resembles to be in that state – all highlights that appear to have no place in our purely physical description of our bodies.

At first sight, then, it would seem that our bodies and our minds are altogether different sorts of substances. It is, then again, plain to any individual who has ever had both a mind and a body that they are more profoundly and inseparably bound up together than this instinct of uniqueness may at first persuade. My body isn't only a vehicle for my mental life. Each idea I think, each activity we perform, or sensation we experience, rather, includes a perplexing and indissoluble engagement of

both mind and body; as the organizer of contemporary philosophy of mind, René Descartes, broadly put it: 'I am not just held up in my body as a pilot in a vessel, however that we so personally conjoined, and so to speak intermixed with it, that my mind and body create a specific solidarity'. On the off chance that we take the intuitions of the last two sections too genuinely, in any case, then we are in threat of slipping into simply this sort of unmistakable image of the mind-body relation. What, then, is the right method to comprehend the metaphysical relation between my mind and my body that will oblige both the instinct of peculiarity and the prospect that our minds and bodies are profoundly interconnected? This is the mind-body problem. These are the possible four ways to respond to the mind-body problem. The primary, substance dualism, says that the mind and the body truly are unmistakable sorts of thing. The body is comprised of a physical substance, though the mind is something more like a spooky soul, and thusly is made out of a sort of spooky mental substance which is non-physical. In the initial segment of these notes I will plot substance dualism, and set out a few contentions both in support of it and against it. The second sort of reaction I will consider is called reductive materialism. According to reductive materialists there is just a single sort of substance in the world: the physical kind. When we talk about mental states and occasions, on this view, we're truly discussing physical states, regardless of whether we don't always acknowledge it. In the second part I'll diagram the core responsibilities of a reductive materialist, and afterward fundamentally present two such records: consistent behaviorism and

identity theories. A third alternative is a sort of trade off between the initial two. Supporters of nonproductive materialism concur with reductive materialists that there is just physical substance in the world. They can't help contradicting the reductive materialist, nonetheless, in the case that the physical stuff is everything to mental phenomena. Regardless of whether our mental states and occasions rely upon, or are made up out of, our physical states, certainties about our mental lives can't be lessened to realities about our physical make-up. We will outline the cases normal for non-reductive physicalism, and after that basically present two such perspectives – anomalous monism and functionalism. A last reaction to the mind-body problem is called eliminative materialism. Like the other two forms of materialism, eliminative materialists just have faith in physical substance. Eliminativist materialists, be that as it may, are undeniably more radical than any of the other forms of materialism. This is on the grounds that according to that see, mental phenomena are not just subject to, or even reducible to, the physical domain; according to the eliminativist, mental phenomena don't exist! I will fundamentally show this view in the last piece of these notes

4. DUAL THEORIES OF INTERPRETING THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP

When talking about "dual" theories we mean every one of those theories of the mind-body relationship that: an) against materialistic monism, and like the dualist theories, concede a corresponding immutability of the "mental" as a result of a capacity, or an outfit of capacities, of the

body; b) against dualism, they support the psychophysical unity of the living organism and, for our situation, of the human being. In such way the mind-body relationship is translated according to the Aristotelian "hylemorphic" metaphysical plan of the form-matter relationship (Gr. hyle, matter, and morphé, form. According to the rendition given by Scholastic anthropology, the otherworldly soul is the form of matter, and "form" and "matter", significantly joined together, comprise the living human body, the main personal substance of a human being and of that "one of a kind" human being, equipped for indispensable vegetative tasks (metabolism, growth, reproduction), and of sensory-motor and scholarly capacities. As for the monist and dualist theories, the "dual" theories have three primary qualities: the first respects the "localization" of the mind as for the body; the second respects the "non-representational epistemology" related with it; at last, the third one respects an original arrangement set forward for the problem of "immateriality" and of post-mortem "subsistence" of the soul isolated from matter. These qualities (particularly the third) are unequivocally present in the medieval idea of Thomas Aquinas, who settled on the decision to reexamine the Aristotelian hylemorphic approach in anthropology - not without working a significant update of its metaphysical premise. He saw that, other than an intrinsic superior lucidness, such an approach could give an incredible consistency with the standards of Christian anthropology, more than that appeared by the Platonic dualist approach, particularly for what concerned the person, its unchangeable individuality and its intrinsic

psychophysical unity. Numerous contemporary authors who work today in the field of cognitive sciences plan to allude to a dual-type, and not to a monist-type metaphysical paradigm, despite the fact that just a couple of them, in the ongoing past, were obviously aware that such metaphysical paradigm was not perfect with the functionalist approach of the cognitive sciences

1. The localization of the Mind: The mind (or, in the Scholastic, Greek-Platonic phrasing, the "soul") is without a doubt a non-material "thing," as Descartes would have loved, anyway it's anything but a "substance" that is finished in its being in the manner in which it is expressed by the dualist theories. It is the formal principle of unity of a stratified entire of material parts (today we would state: atoms, molecules, proteins, cells, tissues, organs, for example, the living human body, a principle that empowers this entire fit for performing certain tasks, at the most those voluntary and scholarly of a personal human subject. It is rather a non-material or "formal" segment of a substance made of material parts that experience constant modification. Where the idea of "form" is understood according to the Aristotelian philosophy of nature, as a constantly adjusting plastic entire of relationships of air of dynamic material parts, consistently altering and associating among themselves and with the external world. A case of it, is given, at the cellular level, by the metabolic physical-concoction action of the cell itself. In this setting the "mind," according to the dual theories, has an interesting area concerning the body, which the mind itself organizes. Rather than being

situated "in the body" and at the most "in the head", as in the majority of the dualist theories (Plato doled out its area to the connection purpose of the neural cord with the cerebellum, Descartes in the "pineal gland" (epiphysis), Eccles in the neurotransmitters of the populaces of neurons in the cerebral cortex), and in the antiquated and modern monist theories, an illustrative arrangement that M. Schlick characterized "principle of introjection", the dual theories rather assert that "the mind contains the body." The mind is in certainty considered as a formal entire of relationships of organization (communication and control) between material parts experiencing a procedure, in constant physical-concoction interaction, that awards to such a dynamic entire a unity, identity and particularity in time, which are themselves additionally plastic, dynamic, in constant modification of adjustment to an environment that changes. In a book which is emphatically and fairly basic towards the functionalist approach to the cognitive sciences, Penrose conveys what needs be on the matter: "A large portion of the material of our bodies and brains, all things considered, is being ceaselessly supplanted, and it is only its pattern that persists. It isn't all absurd to assume that the constancy of the 'self' may have more to do with the conservation of patterns than of genuine material particles". Here is rather what was expressed on a similar contention by Donald M. MacKay (1910-1986), one of the originators of the non-functionalistic approach to the cognitive sciences, to whom, in addition to other things, we should acknowledge the meaning of "dual theories" connected

to this specific kind of theories of the mind: "in any case, it implied that albeit searching for 'the seat of the mind' was not insignificant, it was not something to be accomplished by investigation of the cerebrum into segments and searching for 'action of the mind' on individual parts. Mental movement would be definitively locatable (in principle) in explicit flow-structures of the information-graph; yet this implied the pertinent flow-lines would as a rule stretch out past the bounds of any one part structure, and amid cognizant action may even run out-and-back through the environment. Mentality, as a system-property, could be rendered imperceptible or pulverized by endeavors to restrict its action to any subsystem of the total information-flow pattern in which it was at present embodied". More as of late, a similar thought that the mind is embodied inside the informational flow schemes, internal and external to the body, got support from A. Clark (1997). It stands as the new post-functionalist paradigm in the cognitive sciences, one that attempts to join distinctive elements, albeit not without some confusion. Among them are: the characteristics of the phenomenology of corporeal characteristics of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty; the non-representational theories of the mental exercises which are normal of robotics, of the connectionist approach to the neural networks and of the "environmental" approach to impression of J.J. Gibson; the theories of intricacy utilized in the investigation of the non-linear dynamical systems.

As to localization of the mind or of the "sane soul" of the human being as for its

body, in the medieval times, Thomas Aquinas held a position that was fundamentally the same as that of the modern supporters of the dual theory. He said absolutely that non-material entities, for example, the soul, can be confined concerning the matter that they control and organize, not through a relationship of contact between the external surfaces of a body "that contains" and those of one that is "contained," as it happens between material entities. Non-material entities, rather, must be restricted through "the expansion of the ability to control and organize (Lat. gubernare et regere) matter» that, on account of this worldwide control and organization, establish a living body, an "organism" with explicit resources. For Aquinas the endeavor to restrict the soul and its action in explicit parts of the cerebrum, for example that presented at his occasions by the interactionism of the Platonists is totally wrong and misdirecting. Resorting to this equivalent principle, he defended the omnipresence of God in the universe, for His real ability to administer everything (and not only a body as on account of the human soul in every last one of us). According to St. Thomas, just along these lines does it bode well to state that the entire universe «is in God», as it is expressed by the Holy Scriptures and theology

2.Intentional Theory of Knowledge:

A second normal for the dual metaphysical theory of the mind, promptly connected to the original localization of the mind regarding the body in the theory itself, is that it seems associated with an "intentional" theory of knowledge, as much as the other two sorts of theories may be, in any event in modern

occasions, subordinate upon a solely "representational" theory (representationism) of knowledge. How the history of modern philosophy shows us, the rise of a representational theory of knowledge is just the epistemological counterpart of the progressive establishment of the absolutization of the axiomatic method in modern mathematics and rationale, that identifies in the theory of demonstration and proof the main object of rationale as science and as organon of the mathematical and normal sciences. So much the questioning about reality and the establishment of sayings is well a long ways past the intrigue and the limit of the axiomatic method, how much, correspondingly, does the questioning about the "thinking thought" (the intellectus for the thinkers of the medieval period) that formulates thoughts and produces logical images in a honest relationship with the object, as for the representational theory of knowledge. A questioning, that on the thinking thought, which restrains itself just to the investigation of the "thought which is thought," the thought that controls images which are as of now established according to logical and formal guidelines (the proportion in medieval terms). This got to a point in the nineteenth century when an undertaking was imagined to decrease epistemology and rationale to a one of a kind "universal algebra" of thought, diminished to a pure syntactic formalism involved with the manipulation of graphical "signs", no longer without a symbolic (semantic) esteem. The building of a TM is presumably the higher articulation of the formalist

approach to rationale and epistemology, yet for this very reason it shows, in the meantime, the start of an unstoppable decrease. The intrinsic limitations of the UTM have uncovered the importance of the logical-foundational questions over the calculus and its automation, the last being the major commitment given by the modern logical insurgency from Newton and Leibniz onwards. It is absolutely not because of unimportant shot that the principle of intentionality came to procure an ever more prominent importance in the contemporary epistemological and logical-foundational debate, as it turned out to be progressively clear that there was from one viewpoint a disappointment in the formalist approach to the establishments of rationales and mathematics, and, on the other, the deficiency of the functionalist elucidation in the cognitive sciences.

3.The Mind is Immaterial and subsists:"Post-Mortem". In the thirteenth century, when Thomas Aquinas needed to confront these problems as a philosopher and a theologian, he was in a fundamentally the same as circumstance to our own. From one perspective, he had a conventionalist theology and philosophy of Platonic kind, which were linked to a fading spiritualism; then again, he had the Aristotelian philosophy, which was linked to the way of life of the new universities, and whose theory of the soul as a form of the body made the avocation of the immortality of the soul problematic, particularly when intended as immortality of the individual being. In a specific manner, in the last piece of his life, Aquinas, in Paris, needed to look up to that "lay"

interpretation of the Latin Averroism of Siger of Brabant who, from one viewpoint interpreted in a materialistic sense the mind of the single individual, and then again supported the theory of a single "universal intellect," meta-individual, with the reason for assuring a universality to the results of the logical thinking. As a response to these theories Aquinas proposed his own interpretation of the Aristotelian normal soul as form of the body. In so doing, he wished to obtain two main outcomes: a) to guarantee spirituality or immateriality to the objective resources of the mind, in order to legitimize the limit of universal thought of the single individual, and its freedom of action (in such a way, however, to explain that a cerebral accident could totally or mostly keep the act of these resources); b) to fathom the apparent antinomy of a soul that on a metaphysical scale is a form of the matter of a body, henceforth which determines the "single substance" of the human person, and in the meantime should have the capacity to subsist without anyone else as an individual (and not as a gathering entity) after death, being somehow or another "itself a substance."

5. THEORIES OF MIND BODY RELATIONSHIP

*a. **Cartesian Interactionism:** Body and soul merge at the pineal gland, that certain "something" amidst the brain which is known to discharge melatonin. The pineal gland, Descartes (1596-1650) thought, controlled the heading of certain "spirits" to and from the brain. Without it, consciousness would not be*

possible. Cartesian Interactionism is the conviction best supported by Rene Descartes, he states that the mind and body are two separate kinds of things, yet they impact one another. For instance, on the off chance that you need to scratch your ear, your mind, advises your body to, so then you scratch your ear. Descartes was more conventional, saying that the mind is made up of an immaterial substance, some kind of immortal spirit, while the body is of material being. Descartes says in Meditations on First Philosophy, "Body is of its tendency always distinct; mind is entirely indivisible" (Descartes). In numerous ways, Descartes convictions are best supported by people of religious confidence. The religious argument is the argument that we live on after our physical death, since our mind is immortal. All things considered, who wouldn't have any desire to trust that dualism is valid? Thus, numerous people of religious confidence, acknowledge that there is an afterlife or the like where we can have similar senses we do starting at now and maintain their religious convictions. In this way, many trust that dualism must be valid, since our mind is of an immortal substance. The argument is essentially impossible to refute, making it less demanding to acknowledge the convictions of dualism.

*b. **Double Aspect Theory:** The human being is indissolubly "one" substance, and it is misleading (on this view) to think about her in parts. Be that as it may, such a conception is possible, and human beings are often described*

as part "mind" and part "body" - two aspects of a whole. Double-aspect theory, likewise called dual-aspect theory, kind of mind-body monism. According to double-aspect theory, the mental and the material are distinctive aspects or attributes of a unitary reality, which itself is neither mental nor material. The view is derived from the metaphysics of Benedict de Spinoza, who held that mind and matter are simply two of an infinite number of "modes" of a single existing substance, which he identified with God

c. **Dualism:** The conviction that human beings are made of two substances: mind (or soul) and body. The most influential version of this theory, if not the best, is that of Plato (427 BC-347 BC), who trusted the soul had a pre-history and that it is basically "imprisoned" in the human body. Humans, on this view, are believed to be immaterial beings: that is, they are basically their soul, or spirit. The soul is viewed as the inhabitant to the bodily abode, its lord or lord. Dualism claims to the common-sense intuition of by far most of non-philosophically-trained people, and the mental and the physical do appear to the vast majority to have very extraordinary, and maybe irreconcilable, properties. Mental occasions have a certain subjective quality to them (known as qualia or "the ways things appear to us"), while physical occasions don't. Pundits of dualism have often asked how something totally immaterial can influence something totally material (the problem of causal interaction). With the knowledge gained from

modern science, hardly any, neuroscientists would consider taking a dualist position, and Monistic convictions like Physicalism are presently substantially more common within the field of philosophy

d. **Epiphenomenalism:** The view that the body follows up on the mind to deliver thoughts and feelings, that mental states can never be the reasons for bodily capacities. Mind and body, on this view, don't interact. Materialism: The conviction that the human is the totality of his bodily (material) parts. Similarly that an automobile is involved certain parts - engine, cylinders, shock absorbers, wheels, &c. - so the human being is involved limbs, flesh, blood, internal organs. The theory encounters trouble once somebody solicits which "part from the whole" is involved in a given movement; for instance, in the event that somebody prays to Allah for mercy, wouldn't it be just as preposterous to state the foot and the ear cartilage and the extension of the nose are praying the same amount of as the "soul" is? The reduction to matter and to bodily parts simply doesn't appear to represent states like these, or even states of mind (emotions, feelings, attitudes). Personhood appears to be nobler and more sublime than this.

e. **Monism:** The conviction that each self is an incarnation of the divine, or of the oblivious, or of some impersonal deity. In Indian philosophy such a truth is alluded to as Brahma. Monism is the metaphysical and theological view that all is one, that there are no

fundamental divisions, and that a brought together arrangement of laws underlie all of nature. The universe, at the deepest level of analysis, is then a certain something or made out of one fundamental kind of stuff. It sets itself rather than Dualism, which holds that at last there are two kinds of substance, and from Pluralism, which holds that eventually there are numerous kinds of substance.

*f. **Occasionalism:** The view, as set forth by the French philosopher Malebranche (1638-1715), that mind and body work independently, however is coordinated by God, who makes a mental occasion which is the "event" for the fitting bodily movement. Maybe the most eccentric and effectively dismissed of all the better known theories In the minds of most philosophers with a passing familiarity with early-modern philosophy, occasionalism is ordinarily regarded as a laughable specially appointed or 'for need of anything better' answer for the mind-body problem, first opened up in Descartes' Meditations. As ordinarily introduced in philosophy textbooks, the doctrine (normally identified solely with Nicholas Malebranche) certainly appears to be laughable: beginning from the suspicion that the genuine transmission of anything among body and mind is impossible, occasionalism holds that, for instance, when my finger is pricked by a needle, no physical effect—neither the cut of the needle nor the action of my nerves—achieves my mind, but instead God straightforwardly delivers the vibe of the prick within my mind on the event*

of the needle's contact with my finger. Additionally, when I will to withdraw my finger far from the needle, my incorporeal will is totally inept to deliver any such corporeal movement, so God again intercedes and specifically creates the movement of the finger on the event of my willing

6. INDIAN AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND BODY RELATIONSHIP

IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

- i. **Vedas:**The main accentuation in the Vedas is on the recitation of mantras, prayers and performing the customs to propitiate the numerous gods. There is no unmistakable thought of mind and it is nearly utilized as synonym to consciousness. The idea of mind is articulated through numerous terms, for example, awareness (sanjna), comprehension (ajnanam), understanding (vijnanam), insight (drsti), goals (dhrtih), reflection (manas), and impulse (stick), will (sankalpa). The change from the Brahmana literature to the Upanishads is portrayed by the transmission of values from rites and customs to knowledge and meditation, from confidence to reason and from objectivity to subjectivity.
- ii. **Upanishads:**In the Upanishads the words utilized for mind are manas, prajna, sankalpa and citta. The quintessence of mind isn't consciousness however it is a subtle form of matter and like the body it is made of matter. The eaten food is sorted into three kinds after digestion.

The grossest part moves toward becoming defecation; the center segment moves toward becoming flesh; the subtle ingredient turns into the mind. In the prior Upanishads, no different categorization of mental functions is given however in the Paingala Upanishad, the chain of command of mental functions is communicated as, the five sense organs and the five motor organs; perceiving mind (manas), which coordinates the organs of recognition; intellect (buddhi) the higher organ of thought which discriminates the self-personality (ahamkara); the intuitive mind (citta), the storehouse of past impressions. The mind is likewise said to be two-crease, that is pure and impure. The impure mind is driven by desire and volition; the pure mind is devoid of desire. The mind alone is the reason for servitude and liberation to humans. Joined to objects it prompts subjugation and liberated from objects it prompts liberation. The mind ought to always be made devoid of objects by the searcher of liberation, since the liberation of the mind devoid of objects is desirable. At the point when the mind, liberated from the contact with objects and confined in the heart, reaches being, then that is the supreme state.

iii. Schools of Indian Philosophy:The systems of Indian philosophy are divided into two expansive classes in particular, orthodox (vedic) and heterodox (non-vedic). Under the orthodox, there are six schools specifically, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, Yoga, Mimansa and Vedanta. Under the heterodox, there are

three schools specifically, Carvaka, Buddhism and Jainism. The Nyaya and Vaisesika schools, founded by Gautama and Kanada separately, however various in their origin and early development, were amalgamated later on into one syncretic school known as Nyaya-Vaisesika system. Nyaya is principally worried about the conditions of correct thinking and methods for acquiring genuine knowledge of the real world; and the Vaisesika system formulates its ontological structure based on seven substances (padarthas) in particular, dravya, guna, karma, samanya, visesa, samavaya and abhava. The Samkhya is a philosophy of dualistic realism, ascribed to the sage Kapila. It concedes two extreme substances in particular, purusa and prakrti, which are independent of one another in regard of their reality. Purusa is cognizant, inactive and unchanging while the prakrti is unconscious, active and alterable. There are 3 diverse purusas or individual selves identified with various bodies. Prakrti is made out of sattva, rajas and tamas gunas, which are finer than atoms and adjusted into all physical, biological and psychical entities. Samkhya rejects the thought of God as the creator of the world. The Yoga system, founded by Patanjali, is firmly associated to the Samkhya. It for the most part acknowledges the epistemology and the metaphysics of the Samkhya, however concedes additionally the presence of God. The extraordinary element of this system is the wide ranging treatment of the yoga, which

comprises in the discontinuance of every mental capacity.

A. ORTHODOX SCHOOL

(i) **Nyaya School:**According to Nyaya School, man comprises of atman (soul), manas (mind) indriyas (sense organs) and sarira (body). Each of these has a distinct function to perform.

a. **Sarira** :It is made of material particles of the five elements. It is a composite structure, which is changing, growing and is well-suited to disintegrate and eventually destroyed. It is a base for sense organs; a methods for the soul to come into contact with the external objects.

b. **Indriyas:**These are the explicit organs for explicit kinds of knowledge of objects and for explicit kinds of exercises. They are situated in the explicit place of the body. There are two kinds of indriyas viz. jnanindriyas (organs of knowledge) and karmindriyas (organs of action).

c. **Manas:**It is an organ for attaining knowledge. It gets the report of the sense organs and conveys it to the atman (soul). It likewise catches the internal states of delight, pain and so forth. It is atomic in size and is one in each body.

d. **Atman:**It is the genuine knower, antenna and actor behind the component of mind, senses and body. These are negligible instruments for the atman. Though the mind is anu

(atomic) in size, the atman is vibhu and nitya (boundless in existence).

(ii) **Vaisesika School:**Human being comprises of body, sense organs of knowledge and of action, manas (mind) and atman (soul). The minds and souls are infinite in number and interminable in presence. Every soul in the worldly presence has relationship with a mind, which goes about as the instrument of knowledge, feeling and action. The mind associates the soul with the sense organs of knowledge and through them with the objects of knowledge. The soul is a substance with certain nonexclusive and explicit characteristics. Its nonexclusive characteristics (the characteristics it shares with other substances) are number, distinctness, magnitude, conjunction and disjunction.

a. **Manas (mind, the inner sense):**Manas is a contraption for getting knowledge of what happens in the soul. It is, therefore, the sense through which introspection of inner states is possible and thus it is known as the inner sense (antarindriya). Mind is additionally the medium through which the impressions of the external senses achieve the soul. Mind has no other exceptional trademark with the exception of serving as a medium between the senses and the soul

(iii) **Samkhya School:**According to this school, there are twenty-five principles of development, which in the order of the cosmological procedure of advancement are as per the following:

a. **Prakriti or Pradhana:**It is the elemental or main driver of

everything belonging to the objective world of changing phenomena. The principle is portrayed by a state of solidness of the three gunas (sativa, rajas and tamas). The unsettling influence of this state implies creation in the sense of development of other order of being out of it.

- b. Mahat:** The cosmic intelligence, which is the first manifestation of the Pradhana.
- c. Ahamkara:** The second manifest, arising out of the mahat. It is principle of cosmic 'I'ness (egotism).

The inner body can't exist without the support of the external. The subtle body is made toward the beginning of the appearance of the pradhana, its movements are not thwarted by anything i.e. it is equipped for entering anyplace because of its subtlety: it is lasting (nitya) insofar as the changing universe continues i.e. inasmuch as the universe does not slip by into the pradhana at the season of mahapralaya (the incredible disintegration). It is made up of buddhi, ahamkara, manas, indriyas and tanmatras; it breaks down into the pradhana at the season of mahapralaya, or the constituents of it converge into their causal condition; it is without anyone else incapable of giving the purusa any pleasure in the products of past karma. For this reason it needs a gross body; and so it moves from body to body with the dispositions gained by one's great or awful karmas. The Purusa - a definitive self behind each individual - is pure consciousness, which is unchanging and is active observer (drista) of the considerable number of

changes in body and mind - is the core of the personality of individual.

The instruments of knowledge are antahkarna consisting of intellect (buddhi), conscience (ahamkara), the inner sense (manas) and the five external senses of ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose. The initial three are inner instruments of knowledge since they are arranged inside the body and five are external senses as they are on the surface of the body and are turned outward. The distinctive function of buddhi is ascertainment or determination of the genuine idea of everything. The distinctive function of ahamkara is to allude to the self (narcissism) with respect to instance 'We am doing this or feeling this'. The function of manas is said to be samkalpa. There are two meanings of samkalpa. The manas affirms to the idea of a sense of knowledge (budhindriya) and that of an organ of action (karmendriya) being involved in the functions of both. The function of manas is vikalpa-i.e. question about the idea of an object - whether it is either. Regarding the last mentioned, the function of manas is samkalpa i.e. desire to accomplish something. The function of the senses of knowledge (budhindriya) is to get knowledge of an object. It is simple acquaintance with their proper objects. The more definite and understandable knowledge of the objects, involving that of their name, class and so on is regarding as being expected to buddhi (intellect) after the manas has performed its function of doubting

(iv) Yoga school: Yoga is predominantly a psychological philosophy. It is a

science of mental discipline for attaining the most elevated state (samadhi). A definitive aim of Yoga is finished freedom from the mind and its modifications (vrittis). Therefore, a thorough and basic investigation of mind has been undertaken in Yoga. It is important to know the nature, structure and function of mind in order to be free from the clutches of the mind.

a. **Buddhi**: It is the limit with respect to illumination, determination and certainty. It is the wellspring of excellence, non-connection and knowledge. It shows itself through determination and goals in thought and action, formation and maintenance of idea and speculation.

b. **Ahamkara**: In this aspect of 'citta' the personal consciousness acknowledges itself as a particular 'I'- experiences. It is an inner self principle. It arrogates to itself the experiences held by the manas and passes it on to buddhi to be determined

c. **Manas**: It is the directing force behind all actions. It possesses the limit of consideration, choice and so forth; it synthesizes the discrete complex of the sensations. It can see however can't imagine, as does buddhi.

(v) **Mimamsa School**: Man comprises of a physical body (sarira), sense organs (indriyas), mind (manas), consciousness (jnana) and soul (atman). Every one of these constituents has a distinct function to perform, which is done under the influence of apurva, a concealed force produced by past demonstrations of dharma (uprightness) and adharma (bad

habit). The functions of body and sense organs are more or less same according to all the six systems of Indian thought.

a. **Manas (Mind)**: It is an internal organ through which the worries of the sense organs (about external objects) and likewise delight, pain, insight and other characteristics of the self (internal) are seen. The mind isn't atomic (anu) in measurement as the NyayaVaisesika maintains.

b. **Atman (soul)**: It is an everlasting, immaterial substance, which is all pervading. It is distinct from body, sense organs and cognitions. It transmigrates from body to body. It is the 12 knower (jnata) active specialist (karta) and enjoyer (bhokta). Cognizance, delight, pain, desire, aversion, volitions, impressions, legitimacy and demerit (jnana, sukha, dukha iccha, prayatna, roga, dvesa, sanskara, dharama and adharma) are the modifications of the soul.

c. **Perception**: The soul interacts with manas which are the internal organ and the manas interact with the sense organs and the sense organs come in appropriate contact with genuine external objects. Directed by the manas the external sense organs create impression of sound, touch, color, taste and odor (sabda, sparsa, rupa, rasa and gandha).

(vi) **Vedanta School**: Man is a composite structure consisting of soul (atman), which is the equivalent in all individuals and in the universe. It is called atman in the individual and Paramatman or Brahman in the universe.

This Universal Atman is reflected in or restricted by the bodily instrument of every individual and is called jiva, which for the time being accept an identity and separateness for itself. The bodily system of the individual, and also that of the universe, comprises of individual ignorance (avidya), which is a part of the astronomical ignorance (mula avidya or maya). Antahkarana, the internal organ (mind) comprises of the four aspects or parts of the mind to be specific: buddhi (intellect), ahankara (sense of self), citta (storehouse of past impressions) and manas (organ of consideration) with this instrument the jivatma or the individual self appreciates the objects of the world and undergoes through the different states of experience. There are three levels of objective experience and a fourth level well beyond them. These four states of experience are jagrat (waking), swapna (dream), susupti (deep rest) and turiya (the fourth state).

B. HETRODOX SCHOOLS

(i) **Carvaka School:**This is the unparalleled materialistic school of Indian philosophy. According to it, mind is a side-effect of body and consciousness is the final product of mind. At death the body disintegrates and so does the mind and consciousness. The five sense organs comprise the body and the body is made of four elements viz. fire, air, earth and water. All knowledge is gained from these organs as it were. Mind isn't an organ of knowledge yet it just manages the sensations, which, in turn, lead to perceptions. The continuity of perceptions, offer ascent to a bogus

impression of a lasting substance called mind.

(ii) **Buddhism:**Buddhism has faith in the doctrine of anatma-vada (no-self), according to which there is nothing changeless in the physical or mental realms. There is no lasting, enduring or unitary substance either in the physical or mental world. The personality of the human being is a gathering of a few totals. It is in unending motion, nothing remaining the equivalent in progressive minutes. Its substance change from minute to minute and it undergoes through birth, death and resurrection like a flowing stream. There is continuity yet no identity.

(iii) **Jainism:**The Jainas quality every single mental action, for example, discernment, love and conation to the self or Jiva (soul). Manas (mind) have just a restricted function to perform. The soul is a lasting principle of consciousness. It's anything but a material entity yet an immaterial or spiritual substance unique in relation to and independent of the body and brain. It is a specialist of every single mental movement and is specifically experienced as the 'I' in every such action as 'I probably am aware', 'I do' and 'I feel'. It is the wellspring of every single mental movement and consciousness is its fundamental quality.

IN WETERN PHILOSOPHY

In the Western philosophy, mind is defined in various ways by various schools of thought. According to the philosophy of Materialism just physical matter exists and mind is a spin-off of

matter. This view is known as Epiphenomenalism. Matter is the genuine substance and mind is just a 'gleam' or shadow of matter that shows up under a few conditions. The school of materialism subsequently disposes of mind as an essential reality. The philosophy of Idealism defines mind as an independent and immaterial 19 reality. This view is known as Psychological Monism; it denies the presence of matter and lessens it to secondary importance and holds mind to be the essential reality.

(i) Mind as Material:The essential dispute of materialism is that nothing exists however matter. This view is found in early Greek philosophy. Thales, considered to be the principal philosopher in western convention, held that everything is made out of water in a few forms or another. Philosophers, who pursued Thales, supplanted water via air, fire and earth.

a. Eliminative Materialism According to this view there are no such things as sensations, perceptions and emotions. Regardless of whether these have presence, they are just perplexing forms of matter in motion. The philosophers may have utilized terms referring to such things yet it ought to be remembered that no additional entities are being postulated far beyond the physical entities. The main claim of Eliminative Materialism is that the common sense understanding of the mind is false and that certain classes of mental states that a great many people trust in don't exist.

b. Behaviorism According to this view all terms relating to mental entities allude to the behavior or actions of a being. That is, to feel pain is to moan, writhe and so on or to be inclined towards such behavior. To desire food is to participate in eating the food in the event that it is available and to search for it without food or to be arranged towards such behavior and so additionally with every one of the states and exercises that are called mental. Behaviorism is a logical procedure to the effect that the meanings of the words referring to the mind, its mental states and exercises are broke down in behavioral terms and each mental term is identical in meaning with some behavioral term.

c. Identity Theory of Mind Identity theory or Mind-Brain identity theory is a theory, which attests that mental states are types one and the equivalent to the physical occasions in the brain. In other words mental occasions are identical with explicit physical occasion types in the brain. It doesn't hold that the mind is identical to the brain. Identifying brain and mind involves identifying procedures and states of the mind and brain. Consider an experience of pain or of seeing something or of having a mental picture.

(ii) Mind as Immaterial: Plato was the main western philosopher to declare that mind is an immaterial entity, discrete and distinct from the body and ready to exist without it. Plato held that the mind (psyche) is accountable for the body and coordinates its movements. Plato had confidence in the subsistence of both material entities and immaterial entities.

The most definitive statement of dualism is found in the philosophy of Descartes according to whom mind and matter are two discrete and distinct sorts of substances, totally restricted in their temperaments and each fit for existing altogether independent of the other. The central thought in Descartes was the supremacy of consciousness, that is, the mind knows itself more promptly and straightforwardly than it can know anything else. Mind knows external world i.e. matter just through the impressions of the external world upon it in the form of sensation and discernment. To Descartes all philosophy begins with the individual mind and he makes his first argument in the words 'I think, therefore I am' (cogito consequently total). A portion of the philosophers, who held mind to be immaterial, did not favor the dualist approach as it adds to different challenges in explaining the relations among mind and body (matter).

(iii) Neutral Monism: Another view is that neither the mental nor the physical is extremely fundamental. Each is an aspect of some underlying reality that is neither mental nor physical yet neutral between them This view denies that the mental and the physical are two basically extraordinary things. Neutral monism claims that the universe comprises of just a single kind of stuff in the form of neutral elements that are in themselves neither mental nor physical. These neutral elements resemble sensory experiences; they may have the properties of color and shape, similarly as those properties are experienced. Be that as it may, these molded and colored elements don't exist in a mind considered as a generous entity.

7. CONCLUSION

We can see that the above has demonstrated that there is some credibility to the view that there is a universal rationale to the idea of thinking about minds. With the possible special case of the Buddhist no-self doctrine, it is far-fetched that these arguments were the consequence of dispersion. In this way we can have a reasonable certainty that the majority of these arguments were developed independently. This suggests even outsiders, in the event that we at any point experienced them, might just be vexed by similar concerns, and develops their very own arrangements of materialist and dualist arguments. In the event that a cognizant being advances anyplace, develops knowledge and winds up inquisitive about the idea of mind and intelligence, they will probably wind up rehearsing a considerable lot of similar arguments recorded previously. To conclude, we can state that mind being a constituent part of human being, has a fundamental job in the development of human personality. It has been defined in different ways by various patterns of thoughts in the Indian and in the western philosophy. Since the main accentuation of Indian philosophy has been on the acknowledgment of Ultimate Reality within the innermost depths one's very own self, the endeavors are make it possible by understanding the idea of mental modifications and by recommending the ways for their cessation.

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